

CONFIDENTIAL
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

10

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25 March 1953

**SUBJECT: SE-41: PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE
US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE KOREAN
WAR**

DRAFT OUTLINE OF PAPER

PROBLEM

To estimate the probable military and political reactions of
C.C. and the USSR to certain possible US courses of action with
respect to the Korean war.

I. SOVIET AND C.C. OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS IN KOREA

A. Soviet and C.C. objectives in the Far East

1. Defense and consolidation of their territories and re-
gimes.
2. Eliminate West from Asia.
3. Advance world communism by weakening and dividing non-
Communist world.
4. Etc.

B. The Relation of Korea to over-all Soviet and C.C. objectives

1. Soviet and C.C. interests in Korea (both joint and separate).
 - a. Historic, strategic, prestige, economic.
 - b. Etc.

DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S **0** 1991
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 20 JAN 99 REVIEWER: 018557

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79S01011A001000030020-4

~~TOP SECRET~~

2. The value the Communists attach to their POW stand: to real estate in Korea; to the security of Communist armed forces in Korea; to the existence of the North Korean regime; and to continued Communist control over the unharmed assets of Manchuria.
3. Korea and global war. Probable wish to avoid global war, but the extent to which this desire to avoid global war would outweigh Communist objectives and interests in Korea if the latter were in danger of suffering greatly.

II. PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS

A. To a continuation of military pressure against the Communists at substantially present levels, while the US built up ROK forces and attempted to make the Maximum possible redeployment of US forces from Korea.

1. Extent of pressure this course would exert on Communists to alter their present military and diplomatic policies in Korea.
2. Extent to which the USSR and C.C. would continue to cooperate in conduct of war.

B. To an increase in military pressure (but with current US restrictions still in force) which continued aggressive air and naval action in the Korean area and which stepped up ground operations, short of a general offensive.

1. Extent of pressure this course would exert on Communists to alter their present military and diplomatic policies

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79S01011A001000030020-4

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Probable Communist military reactions, and extent to which these reactions might risk expansion of the war.

3. Probable Communist political reactions.

4. Extent to which the USSR and C.C. would continue to co-operate in conduct of war.

C. To a removal of current restrictions on US operations and an increase in military pressure on the Communists by embargo, naval blockade, unconventional warfare against C.C., air attack on C.C., and if required, by increased ground operations in Korea.

1. Extent of pressure this course would exert on Communists to alter their present military and diplomatic policies in Korea.

2. Probable Communist military reactions.

a. Initial C.C. reactions.

b. Initial Soviet reactions.

c. Possible Communist reactions elsewhere in world, as, for example, against Hong Kong.

d. Extent to which these reactions would risk general war.

e. Extent to which these reactions might be modified by degree of success gained by US forces.

3. Probable Communist political reactions.

a. Political warfare throughout world, including possible Communist subversion, revolutionary attempts, as,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

for example, in Hong Kong, SEA, Iran.

- b. Reaction with respect to an armistice.
- c. Extent to which these reactions might be modified by degree of success gained by US forces.
- 4. Probable effect on Sino-Soviet relations
 - a. Extent to which success of US operations would affect.
 - b. Strains likely to grow out of Soviet and C.C. military and political reactions to US operations.
 - c. Strains likely to grow out of conflicting views toward armistice.
- 5. Effect upon above Communist reactions:
 - a. If US operations were approved by and participated in by UN powers.
 - b. If atomic weapons were employed.

D. To all of (C) above, plus an evident US objective to destroy Communist forces in the field in Korea and establish a defensible line at the waist of Korea.

- 1. Extent of pressure this course would exert on Communists to alter their present military and diplomatic policies in Korea.
- 2. Probable Communist military reactions.

- a. Initial C.C. reactions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

- b. Initial Soviet reactions.
 - c. Possible Communist reactions elsewhere in world, as, for example, against Hong Kong.
 - d. Extent to which these reactions would risk general war.
 - e. Extent to which these reactions might be modified by degree of success gained by US forces.
3. Probable Communist political reactions.
- a. Political warfare throughout world, including possible Communist subversion, revolutionary attempts, as, for example, in Hong Kong, SEA, Iran.
 - b. Reaction with respect to an armistice.
 - c. Extent to which these reactions might be modified by degree of success gained by US forces.
4. Probable effect on Sino-Soviet relations
- a. Extent to which success of US operations would affect.
 - b. Strains likely to grow out of Soviet and C.C. military and political reactions to US operations.
 - c. Strains likely to grow out of conflicting views toward armistice.
5. Effect upon above Communist reactions:
- a. If US operations were approved by and participated in

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

by UN powers.

b. If atomic weapons were employed.

E. To a US program of undertaking such action as required in order to defeat and destroy all Communist forces in Korea, and to achieve a unified non-Communist Korea reasonably assured against renewal of Communist aggression.

1. Extent of pressure this course would exert on Communists to alter their present military and diplomatic policies in Korea.
2. Probable Communist military reactions.
 - a. Initial C.C. reactions.
 - b. Initial Soviet reactions.
 - c. Possible Communist reactions elsewhere in world, as, for example, against Hong Kong.
 - d. Extent to which these reactions would risk general war.
 - e. Extent to which these reactions might be modified by degree of success gained by US forces.
3. Probable Communist political reactions.
 - a. Political warfare throughout world, including possible Communist subversion, revolutionary attempts, as, for example, in Hong Kong, SEA, Iran.
 - b. Reaction with respect to an armistice.
 - c. Extent to which these reactions might be modified by degree of success gained by US forces.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79S01011A001000030020-4

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. Probable effect on Sino-Soviet relations.

- a. Extent to which success of US operations would affect.
- b. Strains likely to grow out of Soviet and C.C. military and political reactions to US operations.
- c. Strains likely to grow out of conflicting views toward armistice.

5. Effect upon above Communist reactions:

- a. If US operations were approved by and participated in by UN powers.
- b. If atomic weapons were employed.

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79S01011A001000030020-4

CONFIDENTIAL